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Abstract
Primary elections in the United States have been under-studied in the
political science literature. Using new data to estimate the ideal points of
primary election candidates and constituents, we examine the link between
the ideological leanings of primary electorates and the ideological orien-
tation of U.S. congressional candidates. We use district-level data from
the Cooperative Congressional Election Study and ideal point estimates for
congressional primary election candidates to examine the role of primary
electorate ideology in the selection of party nominees. We find that more
extreme Republicans are more likely to win their party’s primary and that
Republican and Democratic candidates are responsive to different electoral
constituencies.
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Primary elections are an important - though overlooked - step in the American elec-
toral process, particularly in Congressional elections. Most candidates who wish to run
in a general election must first be nominated by their political party, and the outcomes
of primaries do a great deal to set the stage for general elections. However, there is little
attention given to primaries in empirical research and scant evidence of the relationship
between the preferences of primary electorates and the ideologies of the candidates they
elect.
Primaries tend to draw participation from activist voters who are more ideologically
extreme than general election voters at large or even general election voters of the same
party affiliation (Kaufmann, Gimpel and Hoffman, 2003). However, because there
are few ways of consistently measuring the ideological preferences of candidates who
participate in primaries, scholars have been left guessing whether the preferences of
candidates who win primaries more closely match the preferences of their primary
electorate or their general electorate.
Our study addresses this lapse in the literature. We use new measures of the ideal
points of primary candidates to analyze whether the ideology of a primary electorate
influences the ideologies of the candidates who run in primaries. Examining data from
the 2008 and 2010 elections for the U.S. House of Representatives, we find that the
ideologies of primary and partisan general electorates are significant predictors of a can-
didate’s ideological views. This result holds when we control for incumbency, primary
type, and multiple measures of electoral competitiveness. These ideological influences
help determine which candidate wins the primary, as primary electorate extremity cor-
relates positively with the primary winner’s extremity. We also find differences in the
electoral constituencies to which Republican and Democratic candidates respond.
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Candidates and Constituencies
Within the literature on elections, primaries have not received the same attention as
general elections. Nevertheless, they are a vital part of the election process. Primary
elections became popular in the early twentieth century as a way to give ordinary citi-
zens more control over elections; previously, candidates were largely selected by political
parties. In this study we focus on primaries for the U.S. House of Representatives.
House members require electoral support from many constituencies (Fenno, 1978).
Members of Congress are incentivized to be responsive to their constituents because it
helps ensure their ultimate goal of re-election (Mayhew, 1974). We propose that primary
electorates are a crucial constituency for congressional candidates because members can
only run for re-election if they are first nominated in the primary.
Primary voters differ from general voters in their demographics, political preferences,
and engagement levels. Primaries lack party cues and attract less media coverage, so
they tend to attract more politically engaged, partisan, and ideologically extreme voters
than do general elections (Kaufmann, Gimpel and Hoffman, 2003; Fiorina, Abrams
and Pope, 2006; Abramowitz and Saunders, 2008). These primary voters may draw
candidates’ attention because elected officials tend to represent the interests of engaged
constituents more than disengaged constituents (Bafumi and Herron, 2010; Burden,
2004).
Politicians are strategic in appealing to their constituents (Fenno, 1978) and seek
to maximize their chances of winning (Jacobson and Kernell, 1983). Thus, politicians
are incentivized to appeal to primary voters rather than more moderate general elec-
tion voters (Brady, Han and Pope, 2007; Keele and Stimson, 2005; King, 2003). As
primary voters become more ideological, parties may respond by running more ideo-
logical candidates (Jacobson, 2004). This could encourage more extremity in primary
electorates because moderate voters would be less motivated to turn out if there were
no ideologically proximate candidates to vote for (Callender and Wilson, 2007).
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In addition to electorate ideology, primary type may play a role in determining
candidate ideology. Prior studies have argued that primary rules affect political party
platforms (Gerber and Morton, 1998; Brady and Schwartz, 1995; Westley, Calcagno
and Ault, 2004; Besley and Case, 2003) and the types of voters who participate in
the primary (Jewell, 1984; Calcagno and Westley, 2008). The relationship between
primary rules and candidate ideology follows the logic of spatial voting laid out by
Downs (1957): closed primaries feature more partisan electorates and attract more
ideologically extreme candidates, while the ideologically diverse electorates of open
primaries attract more moderate candidates (Ansolabehere, Snyder and Stewart, 2001;
Burden, 2004; Fiorina, 1999). However, other scholars argue that this relationship is not
as clear as the Downsian story predicts and that different rules may lead to outcomes
that defy Downsian logic (McGhee et al., 2014; Kanthak and Morton, 2001).
Knowing which constituency candidates are more responsive to is the first step
towards understanding how candidates campaign in general elections. Few studies
have examined the relationship between a primary candidate’s ideology, the electorate’s
ideology, and which candidate wins the primary. Brady, Han and Pope (2007) find
that ideologically extreme primary incumbents have higher margins of victory and that
moderate incumbents are more likely to draw primary challengers. Brady, Han and
Pope (2007) represents an important systematic look at the role of primaries but does
not address the role of primary electorate ideology.
Our main goal is to examine whether a candidate’s primary electorate has an inde-
pendent effect on his or her ideological orientation. We argue that because primaries
have become a necessary jumping-off point to electoral success, candidates will strate-
gically appeal to their primary constituents. In order to prove that primary electorates
have a distinct effect on the ideological orientation of their candidates, we posit two
hypotheses:
• Hypothesis 1: Ideologically extreme primary electorates are correlated with ideo-
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logically extreme primary election candidates.
If candidates are strategic about aligning towards their primary constituents, then
extreme primary electorates should generate extreme primary candidates. We also test
whether primary electorates are choosing candidates based on their relative ideological
extremity. This leads to our second hypothesis:
• Hypothesis 2: Ideologically extreme candidates are more likely to win the primary
election than moderate candidates.
We expect that highly ideological candidates have a better chance of winning their
primaries. If primary electorates do indeed tend to be ideologically extreme, then these
electorates should select similarly ideologically extreme primary winners.
Data and Methods
Until recently our hypotheses had been difficult to test. District level primary election
survey data is scarce and has not been representative enough to study multiple congres-
sional districts. Previous studies have relied on samples of congressional districts that
are not nationally representative (Gerber and Lewis, 2004). Ideal point estimations for
congressional candidates are also limited. Ideology measures like DW-NOMINATE are
available only for office-holders, not for candidates who ran for election but did not win.
Other scholars have tried to address this by using self-reported measures of candidate
ideology (Burden, 2004) or estimating ideology measures themselves (Stone, Maisel and
Lowman, 2012). Both methods are subject to bias, do not provide a consistent mea-
sure of ideology across districts and elections, and do not incorporate the ideologies of
candidates’ electoral constituencies.
We use new data sources that address all of these shortcomings and allow us to
explore the relationship between primary electorates and candidates in a more rigorous
fashion.
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First, we measure the ideology of primary candidates using data from Adam Bonica
(Bonica, 2013). His IRT count model uses joint maximum likelihood estimation to
estimate ideology scores for candidates who received money from at least 30 unique
contributors during their election cycle. These candidate ideology scores are estimated
based on the ideology of the campaign contributors. Like DW-NOMINATE scores,
the Bonica ideology estimates map candidates onto a liberal-conservative scale from -3
(most liberal) to +3 (most conservative) using data on individual contributions from
the Federal Election Commission1. The Bonica ideology scores presume that political
actors prefer ideologically proximate outcomes to non-proximate outcomes; other spatial
models of political preferences, like DW-NOMINATE, make this same assumption. The
Bonica ideology scores are ideal for use in our study because they give us data on a wide
range of congressional candidates, not just those who won. By including all candidates
for party nomination in our dataset rather than just candidates who eventually won
their elections, we improve the explanatory power of our model over previous models.
We measure the ideology of a candidate’s different electoral constituencies using
survey data from the 2008 and 2010 Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES).
The CCES asked a variety of questions, including the respondent’s self-reported ideology
on a seven-point scale and whether the respondent voted in a party primary and the
general election, to a nationally-representative sample of 30,000 respondents in 2008
and 55,000 respondents in 2010. The large CCES sample sizes allow us to aggregate
respondents’ ideology scores in each congressional district for the following groups:2
• Primary electorate extremity: average ideology of the people who voted in the
candidate’s partisan primary election.
1These scores also do not include contributions from PACs or other political groups
as well as contributions under $200. Full details about how he generates this measure
can be found in Bonica (2013).
2The supplementary appendix also includes descriptive statistics and discusses our
findings on how our CCES data complement other studies of the ideologies of primary
and general election voters.
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• Partisan general electorate extremity: average ideology of the people of the can-
didate’s party who voted in the general election.
• General electorate extremity: average ideology of all people who voted in the
general election in the candidate’s district, or the district’s median voter.
Most of our analysis uses the absolute values of the Bonica candidate ideology scores
and the district ideology scores; this allows us to compare relative ideological extremity
regardless of the direction of the extremity.
We include a series of control variables in our models.3 These control variables
account for candidate type (Jacobson, 1990; Jacobson and Kernell, 1983) by measuring
whether the candidate is an incumbent, a challenger, or in an open seat election4 and
whether the candidate has previously held elected office5. We control for open and
closed primaries;6 the district’s Cook PVI score and the competitiveness of the primary
election;7 and the candidate’s party identification, a binary variable indicating whether
the candidate is a Republican.
We use regression analysis to evaluate whether primary electorate ideology influences
a candidate’s ideology and probit regression analysis to assess whether ideologically
extreme candidates are more likely to win their party’s nomination. These results allow
3Much of this data was collected from the America Votes series published by the
CQ Press and was coded and shared with us by Stephen Pettigrew.
4The variables for incumbent, challenger, and open election are mutually exclusive.
The challenger variable serves as the baseline category in the OLS model. We define
open seats as cases in which a party does not have an incumbent representative seeking
nomination.
5This variable does not include current incumbents.
6Open primaries allow voters of any party affiliation to participate; closed primaries
allow only party registrants; semi-open primaries allow party registrants and unaffiliated
voters (Gerber and Morton, 1998; Kaufmann, Gimpel and Hoffman, 2003; McGhee
et al., 2014). We exclude all nonpartisan primaries.
7The Cook PVI score measures how strongly a congressional district leans towards
the Republican or Democratic Party. We define district competitiveness as the margin
of victory the winning candidate achieved over the second-place candidate. Highly
competitive elections are scaled as 100.
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Figure 1: Ideology of Different Candidate Types
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us to evaluate primary election dynamics and how they influence general elections.
Findings
We first examine the ideologies of candidates for U.S. Congress in Figure 1, which
shows differences between candidates who run for primaries, those who win primaries,
and those who eventually win general elections. This figure compares Democratic and
Republican candidate ideologies in the 2008 and 2010 House elections. For Democrats,
primary election candidates and winners are significantly more ideologically extreme
than general election winners. Elected Democrats are 0.12 points more centrist than
primary winners(p ă 0.01). The differences between Republican candidates are less no-
ticeable; Republican general winners are 0.04 points more centrist than primary winners
and candidates. Republicans are slightly more extreme than Democrats, particularly
general election winners (Republicans 0.11 points more extreme than Democrats). This
figure demonstrates that primary candidates and winners are more ideological than gen-
eral election winners. In addition, for both parties, the primary winners are significantly
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Figure 2: Ideology of Different Candidate Types
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more ideologically extreme than the general election winners (p ă 0.01).
Figure 2 compares the ideologies of primary candidates and winners and general
winners according to what type of election they ran in. While some literature (Ger-
ber and Morton, 1998; Kaufmann, Gimpel and Hoffman, 2003) concludes that open
primaries have a moderating effect on candidates, we find the opposite. Closed pri-
maries produce the most moderate Democratic and Republican candidates, and open
systems produce more ideologically extreme candidates. Our findings confirm previous
research (McGhee et al., 2014) which finds that open primaries do not, in fact, produce
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more politically moderate candidates because there are very few people who actually
choose to cross over and vote in another party’s primary election. Among primary win-
ners, closed primaries attract more moderate candidates, while among primary losers,
candidates in mixed system appear to be more extreme. This result may seem counter-
intuitive, given conventional wisdom about closed primaries restricting the electorate
to a more insular and activist party base. Hassell (2012) posited that party elites exert
more influence over candidate selection in closed primaries. Given that party elites are
primarily concerned with winning and support candidates close to the median voter,
closed primaries may generate less extreme candidates. Parties may exert less con-
trol over primary losers, which may explain why there is significant variation in the
extremity of losing candidates by primary type.
We next use OLS regression analysis in Table 1 to address our hypothesis that there
is a positive correlation between primary electorate and primary candidate ideology.
Model 1 shows findings for all candidates, Model 2 shows the results for Republicans,
and Model 3 shows the results for Democrats.89 The independent variables in these
models are the three electoral ideology variables and the control variables described
in the Data and Methods section. This table shows that the ideology of a district’s
primary electorate has a statistically significant influence on the ideology of primary
election candidates. A 1-point increase in the district’s primary electorate ideology re-
sults in a 0.074-point increase in a primary candidate’s ideology score—as the primary
electorate’s ideology becomes more extreme, so does the candidate’s ideology (p ă 0.05).
However, other factors have larger effects on primary candidate extremity—the partisan
general electorate extremity, incumbency, and the candidate’s party. The negative co-
8We restrict our analysis in this table to primaries that had at least 30 party regis-
trants in the CCES sample to avoid drawing statistically invalid conclusions.
9We also fit the model using random effects and fixed effects at the district level.
The results from those models resemble the results in Table 1 with minor variations in
coefficients but no changes in statistical significance.
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Table 1: Regression of Candidate Extremity Scores on Electoral Variables for 2008 and
2010 Elections
Variables All Candidates Republicans Democrats
Primary Electorate Extremity 0.074˚ 0.011 0.148˚˚
(0.031) (0.036) (0.053)
Partisan General Electorate Extremity 0.203˚ 0.134˚ 0.190˚˚
(0.038) (0.052) (0.061)
General Electorate Extremity 0.010 0.002 -0.060
(0.040) (0.051) (0.073)
Incumbent -0.267˚˚ -0.245˚˚ -0.324˚˚
(0.055) (0.069) (0.091)
Unchallenged 0.061 -0.040 0.113
(0.046) (0.055) (0.077)
Open Election 0.047 0.023 0.124
(0.051) (0.062) (0.086)
Primary Competitiveness -0.000 -0.001 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
District Cook PVI 0.003˚ 0.013˚˚ -0.002
(0.001) (.002) (0.002)
Previous Officeholder -0.080˚˚ -0.082˚˚ -0.093
(0.030) (0.030) (0.067)
Closed Primary -0.129˚˚ -0.162˚˚ -0.044
(0.025) (0.029) (0.043)
Open Primary 0.048 0.093˚ 0.025
(0.034) (0.039) (0.058)
2008 -0.064˚ -0.036 -0.114˚
(0.027) (0.032) (0.047)
Republican -0.260˚˚
(0.036)
Constant 0.834˚˚ 0.761˚˚ 0.859˚˚
(0.081) (0.121) (.141)
No of Obs 938 587 351
Adj R-squared .1970 .2248 .2727
*probă .05, **probă .01; SE in parentheses
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Figure 3: Means and Standard Deviations of Republican and Democratic Candidate
Extremity Scores
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efficient on the latter variable is likely the result of the ideological uniformity of Repub-
lican candidates. Figure 3 shows a bar graph comparison of mean candidate extremity
scores and their standard deviations broken down by Republicans and Democrats. The
Republican candidates’ mean is higher than the Democratic mean, but the standard
deviation is much lower (p ă 0.001), reflecting a lack of ideological diversity among
Republican candidates.
In addition to the district ideology variables, there were other statistically significant
control variables in Table 1. We found a small positive correlation between a candidate’s
ideology and the district’s Cook PVI score10 and a slight negative correlation with closed
primaries, which reflects the results in Figure 2. Primary electorates exert only a small
10Since Cook PVI measures a district’s presidential voting patterns, this shows that
candidates are responsive to their district’s national voting behavior. This finding is
significant for Republicans, indicating that more conservative Republicans are more
drawn towards districts which were more Republican in their presidential voting.
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influence on candidate ideology, but it is nonetheless statistically significant in the face
of other control variables. Primary candidates respond to their primary electorate’s
ideology even once the ideologies of their general electorates are accounted for. This
finding provides evidence supporting Hypothesis 1 and shows that there is a statistically
significant and positive relationship between the primary electorate’s ideology and a
primary candidate’s ideology.
However, the nature of this relationship depends on the electorate’s and candidate’s
partisanship. We show this by running separate models for Republican and Democratic
candidates in Table 1. Our results show that Democratic candidates respond to their
primary and partisan general electorates while Republican candidates respond only to
their partisan general electorates. In addition, Republican party electorates have a 50
percent larger influence on their candidates than Democratic electorates. The ideology
of the general electorate as a whole is not significant in either model. Incumbency is
significant in both models and has a moderating effect on a candidate’s ideology. In
addition, several other control variables are statistically significant in the Republican
model.
The most interesting question arising from Table 1 is why Republican candidates are
responsive only to their partisan general electorate while Democrats are responsive to
both their primary and partisan general electorate. The answer may be found in Figure
4, which shows the distributions of the four ideology variables split between Democrats
and Republicans. The panels displaying the distributions for primary electorates, par-
tisan general electorates, and candidates show sharp distinctions between Republicans
and Democrats. The median Republican electorate scores are nearly 1 point higher
than the median Democratic scores, and the median Republican general electorate is
0.5 points more extreme than the median Democratic general electorate. Republicans
also have a far lower standard deviation in each of these distributions than Democrats.
There are also differences between candidate ideologies. Democratic candidates have a
12
Figure 4: Distribution of Candidate and Electorate Extremity
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median ideology score of -1, and Republican candidates have a median ideology score of
+1, but Republican candidates have a far smaller standard deviation than Democrats.
For Republican electorates and candidates, there simply is not much variance for our
models to explain. These results indicate that Republican candidates and electorates
are more stringently ideological when compared to Democrats.
As we have found evidence in favor of Hypothesis 1, we now turn to Hypothesis
2, which posits that extreme candidates are more likely to win in primaries. The
results of a probit regression model to test this hypothesis are shown in Table 2.11 The
11We limit the analysis in Table 2 to contested primary elections. Races where there
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Table 2: Probit Model of Primary Win on Electoral Variables for 2008 and 2010 Elec-
tions
Variables All Candidates Republicans Democrats
Candidate Extremity 0.096 0.450˚ 0.080
(0.164) (0.233) (0.224)
Incumbent 0.845˚˚ 0.792˚ 0.871˚˚
(0.216) (0.315) (0.307)
Challenger -0.503˚ -0.469 -0.637
(0.241) (0.350) (0.345)
Previous Office 0.556˚˚ 0.601˚˚ 0.483˚
(0.136) (0.168) (0.237)
Relative Campaign Spending 0.037˚˚ 0.042˚˚ 0.033˚˚
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Constant -2.231˚˚ -2.771˚˚ -1.777˚˚
(0.213) (0.306) (0.315)
No of Obs 993 631 362
Pseudo R-squared 0.6058 0.6125 0.6031
*probă .05, **probă .01; SE in parentheses
dependent variable in these models measures whether the candidate won the primary,
and the independent variables measure the candidate’s ideology, whether the candidate
has previously held elected office and is a challenger or incumbent (with open seats
being the excluded category), and the candidate’s campaign spending relative to their
opponents.12
We find partial support for Hypothesis 2. In Model 1 of Table 2, the candidate
ideology measure is not statistically significant while other variables (incumbency, pre-
vious elected office, relative campaign spending) are. In other words, incumbents, prior
office holders, and heavy spenders tend to win their primaries. However, candidate
ideology is significant in the Republican model, and the coefficient is positive and fairly
large. This indicates that more ideological Republican candidates are more likely to
win their primaries. However, we do not find the same effect among Democrats. This
finding makes sense in light of the analysis in Table 1 and Figures 3 and 4, which show
was a candidate unchallenged in the primary were dropped.
12We also ran a version of this table that interacted the candidate’s ideology with
the primary electorate ideology; this analysis has been placed in the supplementary
appendix.
14
that Republicans and Democrats demonstrate different ideological patterns. Since Re-
publican electorates and candidates tend to be more extreme than their Democratic
counterparts, ideological extremity matters more to winning party nomination for Re-
publicans than for Democrats. While Republican primary electorates care more about
the ideological purity of their candidates, Democratic primary electorates appear to
select their nominees using a different set of qualifications.
Discussion and Conclusions
We show that primary electorate ideology is a significant predictor of a candidate’s
ideology. Furthermore, Democratic and Republican candidates and voters show dif-
ferent ideological patterns: Republicans are more extreme than Democrats, and there
is little ideological diversity among the party’s candidates or electorates. Republican
candidates tend to be ideologically responsive to their partisan general electorate while
Democratic candidates are responsive to their primary and partisan general electorates.
Lastly, more ideologically extreme Republican candidates are more likely to win their
party’s nomination in the primary election.
We recognize that the 2008 and 2010 elections represent an extremely polarized
era (Jacobson, 2012). It is possible that our results are partly driven by this polar-
ization, especially amongst Republican candidates. The lack of ideological diversity
among Republican candidates reflects the relative ideological extremity of Republican
voters, especially primary voters. It is possible that if this study was run in an era of
more ideological diversity within the Republican electorate, we might have seen more
responsiveness among Republican candidates to their primary constituencies. In addi-
tion, these results might change if the nature of the electorate and the candidates it
attracts changes in the future.
Given the nature of our study, it is difficult to determine whether politicians are
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prospective in adjusting their platforms to relevant electorates or whether electorates
are a signal that encourages more like-minded candidates to seek office. Given trends in
polarization among long-term incumbents and a general polarization among candidates
who seek office, it is likely that electorates influence candidate positioning in a com-
bination of these ways. The incorporation of more data over more years would allow
researchers to examine this question in more detail.
These findings indicate that candidates for Congress tend to respond only to the
ideological leanings of voters from their party instead of paying attention to voters from
the other party, which may have troubling implications for how members of Congress
represent their constituents. The trend of primary electorates choosing extreme candi-
dates could lead to a lack of ideological congruence between members of Congress and
their general election constituencies (Bafumi and Herron, 2010) as moderate voters are
disincentivized from voting (Callender and Wilson, 2007), thus further reinforcing re-
cent trends towards political polarization among both elected officials and rank-and-file
voters (Stone, Maisel and Lowman, 2012).
Our findings emphasize the importance of primaries in determining the electoral
environment of the general election. Primaries determine which candidates run in the
general election and which electoral constituency the candidates appeal to. In some
congressional districts that are dominated by one party, primaries are essentially the
only way the electorate can hold elected officials accountable for their conduct. While
the CCES has made strides towards providing primary election data, the discipline’s
understanding of primary elections will increase only if future surveys ask questions
regarding voters’ behavior in primaries. Studies that use only general election data are
not capturing the full picture of electoral dynamics in the United States.
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